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This paper presents some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to 
illegal immigrants. Complementing studies by Chau (2001, 2003),  Karlson and Katz 
(2003) and Gang and Yun (2006), we consider government behavior with respect to 
allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators 
(internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of 
amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the 
effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the 
interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We 
also consider two extensions – intertemporal transfers of policing funds and 
“fuzziness” in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending 
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I. Introduction 
Among the most hotly debated issues in economic and political circles 
worldwide are those regarding the effects immigrants have on host countries. There 
has been a myriad of economic articles written on the subject (see, for example, 
Borjas, 1994 and 1995, and Zimmermann, 1995 for excellent surveys), and it has been 
a central issue in numerous elections throughout the Western hemisphere. One thing is 
clear – except in unusual circumstances,
1 Western countries tend to spend significant 
resources towards limiting the number and/or types of immigrants they allow into 
their countries. These limits are upheld via both border controls, through which 
undesired people are blocked from entering, and via internal enforcement, whereby 
undesired people are apprehended and expelled from the country (see, e.g., Ethier, 
1986) and/or employers are fined (see, e.g., Chau, 2001).  
Despite these efforts, however, many illegal immigrants tend to find a way to 
slip through cracks in the system, if the benefit from doing so is sufficiently large. As 
a result, the more prosperous countries tend to find themselves in a position whereby, 
despite their best efforts, a stock of illegal immigrants accumulates and grows in their 
countries, and the government is unsuccessful in apprehending and deporting these 
illegals. While there have been extensive debates about the effects legal immigrants 
have on an economy, it is likely that these illegal immigrants inflict a greater burden 
on the host economy, for reasons discussed below.  
One way countries have increasingly dealt with such problems is to periodically 
grant an amnesty to any worker who can demonstrate that he/she fulfills certain 
requirements (such as length of stay in the country, no criminal record, etc.). In these 
amnesties, workers who come forward are put through a procedure, at the end of 
which they are either “regularized” by being given some type of permit to remain 
(ranging from a one-year permit to citizenship) or expelled. Table 1 presents select 
information about amnesties over the past twenty years. As seen in this table, the 
number of illegal workers regularized has been quite significant, and there have been 
a number of countries that have had recurring amnesties over a fairly short period of 
                                                 
1   There were instances in which immigration was not only not discouraged, but was actively sought. 
For example, in the middle of the last century Germany was in dire need of workers, and actively 
sought temporary workers from neighboring countries. Many of these "temporary" workers remained in 
the country after contracts expired, and became a part of the large illegal immigrant population of 
Germany. There are signs that this policy of actively seeking temporary workers is making a comeback 




time. In many instances, when countries grant these amnesties, they concurrently 
announce plans to clamp down on border controls.  
There have been few attempts to explain immigration amnesties.  This paper is 
an updated version of our previously unpublished working paper, which, together with 
Chau (2001), were the first articles to investigate this issue theoretically, albeit from 
different angles. Chau (2001) considered the apparent inconsistency between 
imposing sanctions on employers that hire illegal workers, and amnesties granted by 
governments to those same workers. She provided a positive theory of amnesty 
provision in a model where the constrained optimal immigration reform is time 
inconsistent, and demonstrated that host countries can enhance the credibility of their 
immigration reforms by restricting their choice set, and granting a socially excessive 
amount of amnesty to illegal workers. In a latter paper Chau (2003) considered a 
political support model of immigration reforms, distinguishing between border 
enforcement and employer sanctions. She showed that while amnesty may appear to 
run contrary to the original intent of the immigration reform, it may nevertheless 
facilitate rent capturing by politicians. Karlson and Katz (2003) suggested that border 
patrols, the apprehension of illegal aliens, and the offering of immigration amnesties 
may be viewed as different facets of the same policy. The showed that a rich country 
can use this policy mix to attract cheap foreign workers while avoiding low ability 
migrants, who, once amnestied, become a burden on the public purse. Finaly, Gang 
and Yun (2005) reviewed the role immigration amnesties have played in US 
immigration policy, placing them in the context of similar programs embarked upon 
by other nations. The theory of amnesties suggests rent seeking, bargaining, and costs 
as reasons for a country offering an amnesty, often in conjunction with increased 
border controls, internal enforcement and employer penalties. They modeled an 
immigration amnesty in which the destination country has a formal sector which 
employs only legal immigrants, an informal sector employing both legal and illegal 
immigrants, and open unemployment.  They examined wages of Mexicans in the US 




became legalized under IRCA, who under other programs, and who never became 
legalized.  
2 
In this paper we also consider the issue from the perspective of the host country, and 
we consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration 
(border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control
3) and with respect to 
the granting of amnesties (Why), the timing of amnesties (When), and limitations on 
eligibility for those amnesties (How). We demonstrate the effects of government 
actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between 
these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy.  
While there have been numerous studies of tax amnesties (see, for example, 
Malik and  Schwab, 1991 and Andreoni, 1991) there are a few basic reasons why we 
cannot implement these results and models into the migration literature. First, a tax 
amnesty helps the authorities receive information about the illegal activities of 
different individuals and institutes.  As a result of the amnesty the authorities can gain 
knowledge on methods used to evade taxes, and will be better placed to detect future 
illegal activities. This is not the case in migration amnesties, where there is little 
knowledge to be gained by authorities. While it may be argued that the authorities 
learn the origins of the illegal migrants, a fact that may help them allocate their border 
control budgets more efficiently, this information is in general already known to the 
authorities and is not the main objective. Second, one benefit from a tax amnesty is 
that the identity of the transgressor becomes known, which will tend to discourage 
him from future illegal activities of this sort, since the authorities are "wise to him." A 
legalized immigrant, however, will no longer have any incentive to become an illegal 
immigrant again. Third, a tax amnesty is backward looking in that with it authorities 
attempt to collect taxes owed from previous years that might otherwise be lost. This 
element is not present in immigration amnesties, and it is only the future that is under 
                                                 
2 Guzman et al. (2007) consider the relationship between immigration enforcement, smuggling of 
migrants and non-wage income. They show how technological progress in the smuggling industry 
affects the level of migration and capital accumulation, and the effect changes in border enforcement 
has on the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity. Moreover, they investigate 
the optimal level of enforcement as a result of technological progress in the smuggling industry. They 
show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect 
on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid 
will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants. 
3 In considering internal control, we consider deportation of apprehended illegal immigrants, while 




consideration. Finally, immigration amnesties deal with people, and as such the 
amnesty has widespread implications such as externalities on other residents. This, of 
course, is what differentiates between labor economics and other branches of 
microeconomics. These important differences make tax and immigrant amnesties 
incompatible, although there are similarities in other aspects.
4  
The reasons a country might not desire immigration, particularly of low-skilled 
workers, have been widely discussed (see, e.g., Borjas, 1994). These well-recognized 
considerations aside, there are reasons to believe that illegal migrants are more costly 
to a country than legal migrants. Much of the supplementary objection to illegal 
immigration stems from the fact that illegal immigrants tend to be free riders – not 
paying their share of the tax burden while consuming public resources
5 – and that 
because of their illegality they tend to be more involved in illicit activities, both by 
choice and when it is forced on them.
6 Additional issues may include high social costs 
(schooling, health care, etc.), decreases in the wages of native workers, and effects on 
unemployment among natives, although these issues are pertinent for legal migrants 
also.
7 Whether these costs exist and the magnitude of these costs is moot. We will 
make two observations. First, almost all countries limit immigration and try to keep 
illegals out. In fact, countries allocate considerable resources to agencies with the sole 
purpose of controlling immigration (e.g., the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) in the U.S.). Thus, at the very least, government officials believe there is some 
potential harm from allowing free migration. Second, the granting of an amnesty, and 
particularly an amnesty such as that granted in the U.S. in which citizenship was 
given, means that the officials believe that the country is better off with these people 
being legal than with them being illegal. We proceed under the assumption implicit 
from these observations – that illegal workers are more of a burden to a country than 
if those same migrants were legal. 
                                                 
4 Some of these differences may be less distinctive in some European and Asian amnesties. In the 
recent Greek amnesty, for instance, applicants were required to identify their former place of 
employment, thus identifying employers willing to hire undocumented immigrants. In addition, the 
applicants had to pay back “social insurance” taxes, so there was a backward looking element. 
5 Although there are instances in which illegal residents are careful to pay taxes in order to avoid 
calling attention to them. 
6   There are numerous instances of illegal workers being taken advantage of and being the victims of 
crimes. 
7 Of course, the opposite effect also exists. Since illegal workers receive lower wages, local capital 




The next question then is: if this is so, why not immediately legalize all those 
who manage to cross the border? The obvious answer to this question is that such a 
policy will affect the incentives of other foreigners to attempt to enter the country – an 
act that will surely increase illegal immigration. Less obviously, legalized workers 
cannot be thrown out, while apprehended illegal workers can be. Thus, the illegal 
status may be preferred in order to allow for apprehension and deportation. Finally, 
political-economy reasons for keeping the workers illegal may exist, such as the 
benefit from having workers confined to certain sectors, which can be guaranteed in a 
democratic society only if they are illegal (Hillman and Weiss, 1999), or the benefit 
from having them largely unemployed for efficiency wage purposes (Epstein and 
Hillman, 2000). 
The question then becomes: If the cost difference to the country does not justify 
an immediate amnesty, why grant an amnesty at all? One justification could be to 
offset the negative effects increasing border and internal control expenditures can 
have on a country.  There exists a literature on the effects of these expenditures on the 
economy of the host country. Djajic (1999) examines the dynamic implications of 
border control policies and internal enforcement on illegal immigration, and the 
sectoral allocation of clandestine foreign workers.  Myers and Papageorgiou (2000) 
present a model of a rich country with a redistributive public sector facing costly 
immigration control. They show that as border control becomes more expensive, 
inequality in the rich country increases. 
Other reasons abound. First, the social costs from migrants may increase at a 
faster rate if the migrants are illegal than if they are legal. These social costs include 
illegals, as mentioned above, being involved in more crimes, both as felons and as 
victims. If this is so, there may be a critical mass at which point it becomes beneficial 
to legalize them rather than to continue bearing this additional cost. Second, the 
existence of a very large illegal base may signal the natives that illegality is 
acceptable and cause them to not pay taxes, for instance (since their illegal neighbors 
don't). Third, a large illegal immigrant presence may be a sign of impotence on the 
part of a government – which may be harmful both domestically and internationally. 
Fourth, it may be considered inhumane to have such a large illegal population, many 




For all these reasons, and many others, the system is as it is. The illegal 
immigration is unwanted, money is spent to keep them out, and, if they infiltrate, to 
find them and deport them. However, if these steps are not sufficiently successful, and 
the population of illegals grows too big, the country may be better off legalizing them. 
At that point an amnesty is offered, much of the illegal population becomes legalized, 
and the country shifts expenditures from internal control (which becomes less 
necessary after the amnesty is granted) to border control. It is therefore not surprising 
that announcements of amnesties are often coupled with announcements about new 
measures taken to stop infiltration at the border. 
The model will be presented as follows. In section II we first consider a country 
without an amnesty, and then show the effects of an amnesty. To this end, Section IIA 
begins with a country to which an exogenous number of people would like to 
immigrate, and considers the optimal manner in which the country should allocate the 
resources earmarked for controlling illegal immigration, when its options are spending 
funds on border control or on internal control. The former is used to stop infiltration 
by illegals, and the latter to apprehend individuals who managed to infiltrate. We 
show how the stock of illegal immigrants grows over time, and find the steady-state 
number of illegal immigrants. 
Section IIB takes a more careful look at the migrants and their incentives. A 
model is presented in which the decision to migrate depends upon relative wages and 
the probability of being caught and deported. We show how the different parameters, 
including allocations to border and internal control, affect the size of the flow of 
migrants. This behavior by potential migrants feeds back into governmental allocation 
decisions.  
We then turn in Section IIC to amnesties. We show how an amnesty affects the 
stock and flow of illegal immigrants, and, in turn, the cost to the country of these 
migrants. The cost is divided into two parts – the cost of the migrants who have been 
legalized, and the cost of the migrants who will arrive after the amnesty. One of the 
central issues is the effect an amnesty will have on migrant expectations. In particular, 
if potential migrants believe that amnesties will recur, the flow of migrants into the 




optimal time of an amnesty is determined, and show the conditions necessary for this 
to be an equilibrium. 
Section IID considers the possibility of a delayed amnesty, under which only 
those in the country for a certain minimum number of years or more are eligible for 
the amnesty, is considered. We show how this feeds back into potential migrant 
decisions, and, consequently, into costs, and demonstrate the tradeoff from such a 
plan. 
Section IIE looks at a limited amnesty, in which illegal workers who come 
forward are granted a work permit for a fixed period, after which they are forced to 
return to their home country. Enforcement of the time period can be guaranteed by use 
of a bond deposited by the migrant or by someone willing to vouch for him. One of 
the effects of this plan is that some of the illegal immigrants do not make use of the 
amnesty, as it is preferable for them to remain in the country illegally, and take their 
chances that they will not be caught quickly. 
Section III considers two extensions to the model – intertemporal transfers of 
control budgets and uncertainty. Our discussion on uncertainty stems from an 
empirical peculiarity. One of the results of many amnesties is that some applicants are 
refused amnesty, and are then deported (See, for example, the case of Italy in Table 1 
for which we have data both on the number of applicants and the number of people 
granted the amnesty). If the criteria for receiving the amnesty are well known, we 
would not expect anyone to be expelled as a result of the amnesty, since all those who 
would be expelled would not step forward. For expulsions to exist the criteria must be 
unclear, and the reason immigrants come forward nonetheless is that their expected 
gain exceeds their expected loss. Thus, amnesty programs can also be a mechanism 
for ridding the country of some undesirables.  
In Section IV we summarize and discuss the results and suggest additional 
extensions. 
 
II. The Model 
A. Border vs. Internal controls 
Consider a country into which  i m  individuals want to migrate in year i, and 




moment  i m  is treated as exogenous, but this treatment is changed below where its 
determinants are discussed. We assume that migrants attempt to enter the country at 
the start of each period, and that migrants have a work life of N years, after which 
they retire at the end of a period. Thus, a worker entering at the start of period 1 will 
retire at the end of period N if still in the country. In the absence of efforts to hinder 
such immigrants from entering and residing in the country, the stock of illegal 
immigrants in the country at the end of period t (after those who entered in period t-





i t m M
2
.  
The government has at its disposal a fixed yearly budget, E, earmarked for 
immigration control.
8 Following Ethier (1986) expenditures can be bifurcated into 
expenditures for border controls and those for internal controls, where the former 
refers to expenditures aimed at keeping illegal immigrants from entering the country, 
and the latter refers to expenditures aimed at apprehending illegals who managed to 




i = + , where 
B
i E  are expenditures in period i on border controls and 
I
i E  are expenditures on 
internal controls. For demonstrative purposes we also assume, without any loss of 
generality, that the time sequence is such that all expenditures and apprehensions 
occur at the start of each period, so that expenditures on internal controls are effective 
only in apprehending illegals that are already in the country at the start of the period, 
and not for entrants during that period.  
These expenditures are productive in preventing infiltration and in apprehending 
infiltrators.








i E P  denote the percentage of illegals apprehended 
at the border and internally at the start of year i, respectively, with ()0 >
′ j
i P , 
                                                 
8 In Section IIIA we consider how the possibility of intertemporal budget transfers affects allocations 
between internal and border controls, and over time. 
9 Note that we do not include a tenure element in the apprehension probability functions. While it is 
reasonable to assume that a migrant who has been in the country longer knows how to hide better, we 
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i P ,  I B j , = .
10 Given this, the stock of illegals in 
the country at the end of any given year t is given by 
(1)  () () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () 1
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + −
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t t m E P E P M E P m E P M .  
The first term on the rhs is the inflow of new migrants, the second term denotes the 
working migrants who are caught and deported, both of these occurring at the start of 
period t. The final term refers to the migrants who made it passed the border controls 
and were never caught, and have reached the age of retirement from the workforce at 
the end of period t. Solving this recursively: 
(2)  () () ( ) () ∑ ∏
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1 1.  
To understand this equation, note that the stock of illegals in the country in period t 
depends on the flow in period i multiplied by the percentage of immigrants that 




i E P − 1 , and by the probability that 











The government's objective function is assumed to be to minimize some 
function of the cost from illegal migrants, CI, which we assume is monotonically 
increasing in the size of the stock of illegal immigrants. The objective function over a 
certain (possibly infinite) period is: 
(3) 
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10Our assumption is that the percentage caught depends on expenditures and not the number of those 
caught. This is the same assumption made in Ethier (1986) and in most of the related literature, and it 
conveys the idea that the greater the stock, the easier it is to find illegals – “like shooting fish in a 




We assume that the solution to (3) yields strictly positive values of 
B
i E  and 
I
i E  in all 
years unless the stock or flow at some point are zero (as will be the case immediately 
after an amnesty, as developed below). 
The weights in (3), αi, may be, but need not be, related to any number of factors 
including interest rates, other discount factors, political agendas, etc. We will discuss 
some possibilities later in this Section and in Section III, but for now we can ignore 
these weights because of the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1:  With fixed yearly budgets, allocations between internal and border 
controls are independent of time preferences.  
 
Proof: What this lemma states is that the weights do not effect the allocation of 
resources. To see this, replace the third constraint into the objective function by 




i E E E − = . Consider the effect of transferring 
expenditures from internal control to border control in period i. Clearly, from the lhs 
of (3), this will not effect the stock of illegals prior to period i. We differentiate the 
objection function, and note that the Envelope Theorem tells us that only terms in 
which expenditures in period i appear directly are affected, so that terms that refer to 


















where Φ denotes the objective function. Since we are changing only the allocation in 
year i, all changes in the stock in each are the result of the changes in period i. Hence: 

























Hence, the first order condition for a maximum is (using 1): 





























k I j M P m P P C α . 
Note that the term in the square brackets is clearly positive, so the allocations will be 




weights  i α  do not appear in the rounded brackets, the choice of allocation of funds in 
any year i is independent of these weights, as per Lemma 1.     Q.E.D. 
 
The logic behind this finding is that since the budget is fixed, and the stock 
existing at the end of one period is passed on to the subsequent period, allocating 
resources to minimize the stock in one period will automatically minimize the stock in 
future periods also, since a smaller stock is being passed on. The message from this 
Lemma is that the optimization problem as specified is reasonable for deciding how to 
allocate resources between these two uses, since as long as a small stock is desired, 
the government will act as prescribed by (3) with respect to allocations between 
border and internal controls, independent of its intertemporal objective function. 
From (3) we also get 
 
Lemma 2:  The larger  the stock relative to the flow, the more resources will be 
allocated to internal control. 
 











P 1 − = ′
′
. 
Since the left hand side of (7) is a decreasing function of 
B
i E , the result in the Lemma 
f o l l o w s .           Q.E.D. 
 
 This result is intuitive, and has the following implication. Assume we started 
from a stock of illegal migrants of zero and that the probability functions are such that 
the stock is initially growing. This amounts to assuming that 
(8)  ( ) 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 > − − = ∆ M P m P M
I B . 
The first term is the inflow of migrants, and the second term is those being deported 
from among the migrants who made it passed the border in period 1.
11 If (8) holds, 
then the stock will continue to grow initially. Assuming a nonincreasing flow over 
                                                 
11 If the worklife is only 2 years, a third term denoting retirement needs to be included, as in Equation 




time, Lemma 2 says that this will lead to less border control and more internal control 
in order to lower the stock.  
If the underlying conditions (the flow of migrants and the total yearly budget for 
illegal immigration control) remain constant, then a steady state exists. In the steady 
state, both the stock and flow of migrants are constant, as is the allocation of funds 
between border and internal controls, so that all time subscripts on the variables can 
be dropped. The steady state is described by the following equation: 
(9)  () () ( ) 0 1 1 1
1










s m P P M P m P , 
Where the last term refers to those who retire after remaining in the country and 
working for N years.  
It is simple to show that such a steady state exists. Using (2), (9) can be 
rewritten as 
() () () ()
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. 
Simplifying, this becomes: 















s P P P , 
which is tautolgical. The size of the stock in the steady state will depend upon the 
solution to Equation 7, and the ensuing result in Equation 2.
12 
 
B. The Migrants 
We turn now to consider the problem from the migrants' perspective. The 
incentive for migration is the wage differential between the home country and the host 
country. This differential must be great enough to outweigh the migration costs. In 
what follows we assume for simplicity that potential migrants are risk neutral. 
                                                 




B B E P =  and  ()
5 . 0
1 . 0
I I E P = . Assume also that the flow is constant and equal to 100, and that 
workers retire after 5 years. In this case, in the steady state over 95% of the available budget is spent on 
internal control, and the stock of illegal immigrants is 330.6, with 95.8 new migrants successfully 




There are Q heterogeneous workers in the source country each year who are 
interested in migrating.
13 Wages vary across workers, with the distribution of source 
country wages by potential migrants given by  ( )
I S
i W W , 0 ~ , where 
I W  is the wage 
received in the host country as an illegal immigrant.  ( )
S
i W g  is the pdf and  ( )
S
i W G  the 
cdf of the wage distribution. Anyone earning more than 
I W in the source country is 
not a potential migrant.  
There are potentially three types of costs associated with migration, any or all of 
which may exist – a cost of attempting to migrate, CM, a cost if caught at the border, 
CB, and a cost if caught inside the host country and deported, CD. Workers will 
migrate if their expected income in the host country during their N years in the 
workforce is greater than the expected income in the source country over the same 
period. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume no discounting. 




i NW V = . In the host 
country the expected wage depends on the probability of being caught and deported. 
For worker i in period e this is given by: 
(10)
()






















































P C W W P P
C P C NW e V
. 
The first term equals the wage in the source country, so that anything received above 
this in the host country is the wage premium from migration. The second and third 
terms, respectively, are the costs of migrating and the cost of being caught at the 
border, with the latter only being incurred if caught. The fourth term refers to the 
wage premium, ( )
S
i
I W W − , which is achieved only if the worker manages to slip 
through the border controls. This occurs with probability ( )
B





















k e P  
                                                 
13 Note that we do not include network effects. It is quite plausible that the flow desiring to migrate 
depends on the stock of similar migrants in the host country (see Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2000). If 
this is so, a model aiming to analyze the incentives to migrate would have to define the stock of 
migrants as all those from the same country, whether legal or not. Such a definition would differ from 




is the sum of these probabilities over the N years. Note in particular the 1 in this 
equation stems from the fact that the migrant will receive the premium in the first 
period with certainty since internal controls are assumed to be relevant only for those 
in the country the prior year. The final term is the expected cost of being deported, 














1 1 being the probability of being deported at some point in the 
future.  




i V V >  will attempt to migrate. Thus, the flow of 
migrants in period e will be given by: 
(11) 
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Note that, quite naturally, an increase in either internal control or border control 
expenditures will lower the number of migrants attempting to enter the country. What 
is unclear from (11) is how a shift from one to the other will affect migration. Say we 
consider a shift from border control to internal control (as per Lemma 2). On the one 
hand, the probability of getting in to the country increases, however, the probability of 
being caught and deported once inside the country also increases. In terms of 
Equation (11), the first set of terms in the numerator decreases (leading to more 
migration) while the second term increases (leading to less migration). In addition, the 
denominator decreases, leading to less migration on both accounts. As a result, if CM 
and  CB are dominant costs, the result is unclear (both the numerator and the 
denominator decrease), however, if CD is the dominant cost, we will have the 
following result: 
 
Proposition 1: Beginning from an initial stock of migrants below the steady state 
level, the flow of migrants will decrease over time.
14 
 
                                                                                                                                            
concerning ourselves with the origin of these migrants, and we do not include legal migrants or those 




Proof:   Recall from Lemma 2 that if the stock relative to the flow increases, more 
resources will be allocated to internal control. Assume a constant flow. If we begin 
with a stock below the steady-state for that size flow, (8) will hold, and the stock will 
grow. Then, from Lemma 2, future allocations to border control will decrease in favor 
of increased allocations to internal control. As a result, if the numerator of (11) 
increases,  the  flow  will  fall.        Q.E.D. 
 
With the flow falling but the stock rising, a steady-state will be approached, and 
it will be reached when (9) holds, at which point allocations and flows will remain 
constant.  This steady state is shown in the two panels of Figure 1. The top panel 
shows how allocations are changing over time, and the bottom panel shows the 
implications for the stock and flow of migrants over time. Both show the steady-state 
levels of the variables. 
 
C. An Amnesty  
To understand the effect of an amnesty, we first consider how the expectation of 
an amnesty will affect the flow of migrants, and then show the consequences of an 
amnesty for the host country. Given these consequences, we show how the optimal 
timing of an amnesty is determined. 
Assume, then, that a country decides to grant an amnesty once every A years.
15 
For this to be an equilibrium, each party must be aware of the incentives and reactions 
of the other party, and must take these into account in choosing actions. Thus, in 
equilibrium, the timing of an amnesty (if any) is set by the government after taking 
into account the reaction of potential migrants to this timing, and migrants, in turn, 
knowing the government’s objective function, know when the amnesty will occur. 
After an amnesty workers become legal and can no longer be deported. The expected 
                                                                                                                                            
14 This Proposition depends on the assumption that there are no costs of migrating or of being caught at 
the border. If this assumption is relaxed, the flow of migrants may fall or increase, and a more exact 
specification of the functions is necessary to arrive at clear conclusions. 
15   The length of time between amnesties in our model will be constant in equilibrium because the 
problem always looks identical after each amnesty, as developed below. However, it must be noted that 
reality rarely behaves precisely as predicted by a deterministic model, and a glance at Table 1 shows 
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and the number of workers migrating will increase from (11) to: 
(13) 


























































This occurs for each cohort of potential immigrants from amnesty to amnesty, or, if 
the length between amnesties is greater than the work-life of the immigrant, for the 
last N years before an amnesty. 
Note that if expenditures on internal control are kept constant over time, the 
flow of migrants into the country is going to increase as the amnesty approaches (as e 
gets smaller) even if the only cost of migrating is the deportation cost. This is in direct 
contrast to Proposition 1. Even if, as per Lemma 2, expenditures on internal control 
rise over time, it is likely that the positive effect of the approaching amnesty, and the 
benefits to be realized if the migrant manages to escape detection until then, will 
outweigh the negative effect of increased internal control. Thus, Lemma 2 and 
Proposition 1 are most likely reversed if an amnesty is known to be forthcoming. The 
stock of migrants in this case is demonstrated in Figure 2, in which the amnesty 
periods are marked. Note that the presence of an amnesty makes the shape of the 
curve between amnesties different from that presented in Figure 1. 
Having shown the effect of an amnesty on potential migrants, we turn now to 
the government's decision to enact such an amnesty. In choosing whether and when to 
grant an amnesty, the government, for its part, must take into account not only the 
higher per period cost illegal immigrants inflict on the economy, but also the effect an 
amnesty will have on future immigration waves, as demonstrated above, and the fact 
that an illegal worker can be deported, while a legal worker cannot.  
                                                 
16 Note we have assumed that the migrant's wage does not change after becoming legal. There is good 




We first posit the following: 
 
Proposition 2: The longer the length of time between amnesties, the larger will be the 
stock of illegal migrants prior to the amnesty. 
 
Proof: Proof by contradiction. Consider amnesties after A and A+1 periods, denoted 
the  A-regime and the A+1-regime, respectively. In the period just before the 
amnesties, which we denote period T, assume that the stock of migrants under the two 
regimes is equal. The size of the flow will be affected only by the allocation between 
border control and internal control in this period (the other conditions, such as costs, 
are exogenous) since all migrants who manage to enter the country will be granted an 
amnesty at year's end. The optimal allocation will therefore be the same in both 
periods, as will the flow of migrants. Then. Returning to period T-1, the flows will 
again be equal because of the identical allocations in the last period. As a result, 
allocations will also be identical under the two regimes in period T-1. This can be 
continued until the period T-A. However, in period T-A the stock under the A-regime 
is by definition 0 (since an amnesty was just declared) while that in the A+1-regime is 
positive because of the migration in the preceding period. Thus, the stocks cannot be 
equal in period T.   
Assume now that the stock in period T is larger under the A-regime than under 
the  A+1-regime. Then by Lemma 2 more resources will be allocated to internal 
control in the last period in the A-regime, so the flow in period T-1 will be smaller in 
the A-regime. This is because if the same resources were allocated in both cases the 
flows would be identical, and Equation (7) would not hold. Hence, to get a larger 
stock in period T, an even larger stock must have remained from period T-1. 
Continuing, as in the previous paragraph, to period T-A, the stock in this period will 
have to be greater in the A-regime, which is impossible. Thus, the proposition holds.
             Q.E.D.  
 
This proposition is not obvious since the longer period before the amnesty will 
lead to smaller flows of migrants, and this effect had the potential to lead to a lower 
                                                                                                                                            




total illegal presence. From the proof it is clear why this does not occur. This 
proposition now allows us to consider the issues involved in choosing the optimal 
timing of an amnesty.  
We assume that the government is benevolent, and that it desires to allocate 
resources (on border and internal controls) and to set policy (on the frequency of 
amnesties) in order to minimize the cost to the country from these immigrants.
17 
Allocations of resources are as derived above in Section IIA. An amnesty, however, 
entails a tradeoff. On the one hand, illegal immigrants are assumed to be more costly 
to the country than if they were legalized, for the reasons discussed in the 
introduction. We denote the yearly cost of M illegal workers CI (M) and of M legal 
workers CL(M), with CI (M) > CL(M). Hence, the earlier the amnesty the less costs the 
country must bear from migrants already in the country. On the other hand, once a 
worker is legalized he can no longer be expelled, and the earlier the amnesty, the 
larger the flow of migrants (as developed above). Thus, for instance, if an amnesty is 
granted each year there is no cost from illegality (although there is a cost from the 
legal migrants), but all foreign workers for whom the salary difference is enough to 
cover the migration costs will desire to migrate, and if they get passed the border 
controls they will remain in the country until they retire.  
We now develop the conditions necessary for an amnesty once every A years to 
be optimal and an equilibrium. Assume the economy is at a point at which it must 
decide whether to grant an amnesty (A years after the last amnesty). Recall from the 
discussion above that the flow, and thus the stock, of illegal migrants depends on the 
allocation of expenditures on border and internal controls, and on the length of time 
between amnesties. The government takes this relationship into account in 
determining these parameters. We thus define the cost of illegal immigrants at period i 
given an amnesty period of A as CI(Mi(A)), and the cost of the same number of legal 
workers as CL(Mi(A)). When such an amnesty is granted, the illegal immigrants turn 
legal, and each legal immigrant remains in the country until he retires. Thus, an 
amnesty granted in period A will lead to the presence of legal migrants until period 
A+N-1, but the number will decrease over time since the earlier arrivals also retire 
                                                                                                                                            
of further increasing the flow of immigrants as the amnesty date approaches. 
17   Note that this stated goal implies specific weights (α) in Equation (3). Changing the government's 




earlier. Thus, Mi(A) denotes the number of legal migrants remaining i years after the 
granting of an amnesty in year A. At period A, when the government is considering 
granting an amnesty, the cost of the existing and all future illegal immigrants that will 
result from a policy of amnesties every A periods is given by:
18 



















where δ  is the discount rate.
19 The first term is the present value of the cost to the 
economy of those workers who have been legalized and will now remain in the 
country until retirement. The second term is the cost of all those immigrants who 
arrive between this amnesty and the next amnesty. The final term reflects the fact that 
the problem the government faces before this amnesty is identical to the one it will 
face before the next amnesty. Solving (14), we get: 
(15)  ()



























For A to be an optimal amnesty frequency, it must be the case that having an 
amnesty once every A periods is no more costly than having one once every B 
periods. This amounts to requiring that: 
(16) 
() () ( ) ()
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As shown in Proposition 2, the stock of immigrants will be greater in the final, and 
each intermediate, period the longer the amnesty period. Thus, if B>A this will tend to 
make the RHS larger than the LHS. However, legalization occurs less often, which 
leads to two benefits from a later amnesty – lower costs from legalized aliens because 
of the less frequent amnesties (this is witnessed by the larger discount factor in the 
                                                 
18 In the case where A is a continuous variable and the amnesty can occur at any point in time (14) 


















, and (14') is a 
continuous function defined on a closed and compact set. Thus, there exists a level A that 
minimizes () A C . In the case that A can only take on an integer value, we can find the value of A that 
minimizes (14') and then test which of the integers closest to it minimizes (14).      
19 We changed the notation for time preference from that used in Equation 3 (α) to denote that while 
above we placed no restrictions on the relative values over time (see Lemma 1), here the deterioration 




denominator on the RHS), and by the additional period of a low stock of illegal 
migrants when the amnesty frequency is lengthened. 
For A to also be an equilibrium amnesty frequency it must not be worthwhile for 
the government to “fool” migrants. In other words, given that consumers believe that 
an amnesty will occur after A periods, it must not be beneficial for the government to 
either proclaim an amnesty a year earlier or to push the amnesty off for an additional 
year. To evaluate this, we assume that potential migrants can be fooled only once, and 
that if, for instance, an amnesty is pushed off by one year, migrants will then believe 
that amnesties will occur only once every A+1 periods. We consider the possibilities 
of delaying the amnesty by one year or of bringing the amnesty forward by one year. 
These conditions amount to: 
(17a) 
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(17a) compares costs of an amnesty in period A with an amnesty in period A+1, 
when migrants expect the amnesty in period A. (17b) looks one period earlier, and 
compares the cost of waiting until the expected time for an amnesty, and proclaiming 
an immediate amnesty. The same tradeoffs discussed above continue to be present. 
 
D. A Delayed Amnesty 
An often-used strategy is to declare an amnesty only for those who can prove 
that they have been in the country for some minimum period. Thus, for example the 
1986 U.S. amnesty required proof of residence in the U.S. from at latest January 1, 
1982, and the Dutch 1995 amnesty required proof of presence for at least 6 years. 
The aim of such a plan is to limit the effect of the amnesty on the desire of 
migrants to enter the country in order to be eligible for the amnesty. Say the amnesty 




value of immigrating depends on when one migrated. If he migrated before the cutoff 
date, e.g.,  τ ≥ e periods before the amnesty, then income is given by (12). However, if 
he migrated after the cutoff date, he will not become permanent until the next 
amnesty, so his lifetime income is given by: 
(18) 
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The effect of such a plan is that all those who fall into this latter category will have a 
greatly lessened incentive to migrate. For this reason, and mostly because fewer 
immigrants will be around to receive the amnesty, the number of workers for whom 
the amnesty applies will be smaller. Assuming an amnesty every A years, and 
assuming  τ + > A N  the stock of migrants eligible for the amnesty will be: 
() () ( ) () ∑ ∏
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The other side of the coin, of course, is that such a plan limits the benefit from 
the amnesty, since all those who entered the country during this “incubation” period 
remain in the country, and remain illegal. Thus, the stock of illegals is reduced, but 
not to zero. The stock of illegal immigrants that remain in the country immediately 
following an amnesty is: 
() () ( ) () ∑ ∏
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The stock of illegal immigrants over time is exhibited in Figure 3. Note that, 
compared to Figure 2, the stock rises slower due to the decreased incentive to migrate, 
but it also falls less after an amnesty.   
The government would like to set internal and border control allocations, an 
amnesty frequency, and an incubation period that brings the cost from illegal 
immigrants to a minimum. Thus, in an analogous manner to that above, the 
government would like to minimize 
























Conditions analogous to (16) and (17) will need to hold for this to be an equilibrium. 




E. A Limited Amnesty 
Many countries plagued by illegal immigration are reluctant to grant the type of 
amnesty granted in, for instance, the U.S. (where citizenship was granted) because 
they are not interested in having these illegals become citizens in their country. For 
these countries, the goal of the amnesty is often to rid the country of these 
undesirables. To this end, they devise an amnesty that will be sufficiently attractive to 
entice the illegal immigrants to come forward, while at the same time limiting their 
duration in the country. A limited amnesty is just such a plan, whereby workers are 
given a permit to remain and work in the country for a limited period of time, and are 
then required to leave once the permit has expired.
20 Thus, for example, the Greek 
amnesty in 1998 was comprised of two stages.
21 In the first stage workers were 
invited to submit applications for a temporary residence permit (a white card), and in 
the second, they could apply for a green card if they could prove that they had worked 
for at least 40 days between January and July 1998. The green card enabled the 
worker to remain 1-3 years, with subsequent renewal for two years possible. Special 
provisions also existed for the granting of five-year permits. The 43% of those with 
white cards who were not granted green cards and who remained in the country are 
again considered illegal.
22 
A limited amnesty introduces a new consideration into the model. Until now, all 
those eligible for an amnesty requested the amnesty. With a limited amnesty, 
however, those workers with a longer horizon will choose to bypass the amnesty, and 
instead remain illegal. In particular, the amnesty will certainly be accepted by anyone 
whose remaining work-life is shorter than the length of the work permit, but will tend 
to be rejected by those who will continue working for many years after the permit 
expires. In addition, the amnesty will be more attractive to those who lose less by 
                                                 
20   Any such plan must lend for the contingency that the worker will decide to overstay his permit, and 
will disappear into the economy and once again become an illegal immigrant. Thus, the granting of 
such a permit must include a mechanism that will allow the authorities the ability to enforce the 
departure of these illegal aliens. One such mechanism is the posting of a bond by the worker or his 
employer that is forfeited if the worker does not leave the country on time. For the effects of such 
bonds on illegal immigrants and their employers, see Epstein, Hillman and Weiss (1999). 
21   See Trends in International Migration, 1999. 
22   Korea, for instance, took a slightly different route. In their 1997-8 and 1999 amnesties they did not 
grant work permits, but rather allowed the illegal residents to leave the country without risking 




returning home because the wage differential is relatively low, i.e., those for whom 
S
i W  is relatively large.  
Consider, then, an illegal worker, i, with a remaining work-life of X years, being 
offered a permit for Y years, Y<X. He will accept the offer if:  
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Note that our assumption that the worker's wage does not change once becoming 
legalized (see fn. 14) limits the desirability of such a program. Were we to make the 
wage once legalized higher than when illegal, the number of people coming forward 
to accept this offer of amnesty would increase. The qualitative results, however, 
would not change. 
There will also be an effect on those intending to migrate. The expected income 
of a potential immigrant will be equal to 
(21)
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The first term in the brackets give the expected income if the worker accepts the 
amnesty he will be offered, and the second term is the expected income if he does not. 
This latter term is identical to (10). 
The result of this type of amnesty is that, in most cases, the amnesty will not rid 
the country of all illegal workers. Some will remain illegal, and continue to inflict the 
same costs upon the host country as in the original model. However, the incentive to 
migrate to the country is less than with a full amnesty, so again the stock of illegals in 
the country can be expected to vary as in Figure 3.  
Interestingly, such a plan will actually make the incomes of those who do not 
accept the amnesty higher because government allocations will be shifted towards 




an amnesty increases flows, but the amnesty itself lowers the stock. Thus, the essence 
of this amnesty limits its degree of success. 
Much as in the previous section, the government would like to allocate resources 
and set the length of the temporary work permit and of the amnesty frequency such 
that it minimizes costs from the immigrants (both illegal and legal). In order to do so, 
the government should take into account the effect the length of the permit has on the 
percentage of people that will accept the amnesty offer, and the effect on new 
migration. The cost from such a program is: 
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where the illegal population at the time of the amnesty is divided into those who 
accept the amnesty,  () Y A M
L , 1 , and those who do not, and are included ,in addition to 
new migrants, in  () Y A M
I , 1 . 
It is also possible to combine a limited amnesty with a delayed amnesty. As 
discussed above, the goals of these two types of amnesty are different. Those using a 
limited amnesty are interested in getting rid of as many migrants as they can, while 
those using a delayed amnesty tend to desire the naturalization of the migrants who 
have been in the country for a sufficiently long period. Perhaps for this reason, there 
have not, to our knowledge, been amnesties that have combined these two 
arrangements. It is possible, however, that the two could be used in tandem in order to 
minimize costs. From a modeling perspective, this would mean simply combining this 
and the last section, and minimizing costs over three arguments – the frequency of the 
amnesties, the incubation period, and the length of the temporary permit. The 
qualitative results would not change. 
 
III. Extensions 
A. Intertemporal budget transfers 
In Section IIA we considered a situation in which there was no amnesty, and the 
budget was fixed in each period. Returning to that scenario, consider now the effect of 
a budget that is fixed for the entire period, but can be transferred intertemporaly. In 




Lemma 1 may not hold. Equation (3) continues to be the objective function, but the 
third constraint now becomes: 
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where E is now the total budget allocated to the illegal immigration problem over the 
entire period. We thus rewrite the objective function as: 
(23) 
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whereλ  is a LaGrange multiplier.
23 Assuming, without loss of generality, that N>T, 
the first-order conditions are: 
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and condition (22). Comparing (24) and (25) for any given i, we get condition (7) 
again – independent of the amount allocated to a certain period, the allocation within 
the period is the same as before, for the same reasons. Comparing the allocation 
across periods is more difficult, and without further specifying the variables little can 
be said. We will, however consider two cases. Under the assumption that the flow (m) 
is constant over time, we consider the case where there is no time preference (i.e., all 
the  i α 's are equal), and the case where only the stock at the end of the period 
(possibly when a new election is to be held) is of interest. 
 
i. No time preference 
If all periods are given equal weight (e.g., the government is benevolent, there 
is no discount factor, and the cost from illegal workers is linear in their stock), then 
() 1 1 + = T k α , so the first order condition can be rewritten as: 
                                                 








































































This yields the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Beginning below steady-state, with a constant flow of immigrants, and 
when each period is of equal importance, allocations to border control will decrease 
over time, while the direction of change in allocations to internal control is 
ambiguous. In addition, as long as the flow of migrants is nondecreasing over time 
the ratio of expenditures on border control to internal control decreases over time. 
 
Proof: Comparing the first order condition (24') over two consecutive periods, we get 
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The bracketed term on the RHS is clearly smaller than that on the LHS, so the second 




k E E < +1 . 
Comparing (25') for two consecutive periods: 
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Since  1 − ≥ k k M M , it is not clear whether expenditures increase or fall. The last part of 
the proposition follows directly from Lemma 2.        Q.E.D. 
 
 
Decreasing border control expenditures occur because earlier arrivals affect the 
stock for more periods, so it is more efficient to reduce the stock during the earlier 
periods rather than in later periods when their effect is for a more limited time period. 
This effect would seem to exist for internal controls also, but there is an opposing 
effect due to the growing size of the stock, making internal controls more crucial in 




Recall from (11) that the flow depends on internal control expenditures and not 
on border control expenditures. Since it is uncertain how internal controls change over 
time, it is also uncertain how the flow of migrants will change over time. Note, 
however, that in keeping with our discussion of amnesties above, if the flow of 
migrants increases over time, allocations to both border and internal controls may still 
rise. 
 
ii. Preference for the last period 
In political economy literature, it is believed that politicians and voters place 
significant importance on occurrences during an election year. For instance, it is well 
known that governmental expenditures (particularly at the municipal level) increase 
during election years (see, for example, Nordhaus, 1975, Frey and Schneider, 1978, 
Rosenberg, 1992, and Rozevitch and Weiss, 1993). The importance of the election-
year situation to voters extends to any issue pertinent to a campaign, with illegal 
immigration being no exception. It would be difficult for a challenger to an office to 
make an issue of the level of illegal immigration that pertained a few years earlier. 
Clearly, the current state of affairs is what voters are mostly concerned with. We take 
this idea to the extreme, and propose as follows: 
 
Proposition 4:  When the stock in the last period is the only concern of the 
government, if the flow of migrants is nondecreasing over time, allocations to both 
border control and internal control will increase over time, and if the flow of migrants 
is increasing over time, allocations to border control may rise or fall, but allocations 
to internal control will still increase over time. 
 
Proof: Under this setting, the optimization problem is simplified, as  1 = T α , and all 
other 0 = i α . The first order conditions become: 


























































Compare now two consecutive periods, k and k+1, and assume that  1 + ≤ k k m m . From 
(24") we see that in equilibrium: 
(28)  () ( ) () ( ) 1 1
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Since the first term is strictly less than one and the second derivative of 
B
i P  is strictly 




k E E > +1 . If, however,  1 + > k k m m     expenditures on border 
controls will increase only if ( ) 1 1 1 + + < − k k
I
k m m P . 
With respect to internal controls, a comparison of two consecutive years yields: 
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Since the population of illegal immigrants grows until the steady state and then stays 




k E E > +1 , independent 
of the direction of the flow.             Q.E.D. 
 
The logic behind the border control result is that immigrants who enter at an 
earlier period may still be caught and deported later on, so it is less important to catch 
them at the border. Those who manage to enter closer to the election year, however, 
will probably still be around at the end of the period, so it becomes more important to 
keep them out. Thus, unless the flow is significantly decreasing over time, 
expenditures will increase. With respect to internal controls the larger the stock the 
more illegals will be caught and deported, so expenditures on internal control become 
more cost efficient.  
Recall from Section IIB that the increase in internal controls should lead to a 
decrease in the flow of illegal immigrants. Thus, while we can conclude that internal 
control expenditures will increase, it is not clear what will happen to border control 
expenditures. If, however, an amnesty is imminent, the flow of migrants will tend to 




not guaranteed, however, since the increasing budgets allocated to apprehension may 




An interesting empirical aspect of amnesties is that there tend to be migrants 
who come forward to get an amnesty, but are then denied the amnesty and instead 
shipped out of the country. This seems to be an unintentional (or perhaps intentional) 
side effect of the amnesty. In this section we consider whether this can be an 
equilibrium strategy. 
Say potential candidates for an amnesty are distributed along an additional scale 
with respect to some variable that is of concern to the authorities. For instance, 
authorities may say that those found to have been involved in illegal activities of some 
sorts (theft, drugs, etc.) will be brought before a board to decide whether to grant them 
amnesty or to deport them. In this case, those clearly not involved will step forward, 
those heavily involved will not, but those in the middle will step forward only if their 
expected gain is positive.  
From Equations (12) and (10) we can discern that the gain from being granted 
an amnesty to a worker depends on how many periods he has remaining in his 
worklife, and is given by: 
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The first set of terms is the addition wage received over the migrant’s remaining 
worklife, and the second set of terms is the expected savings from the fact that it is 
clear that he will not have to bear the deportation cast once he has received the 
amnesty. If, however, the worker who steps forward for an amnesty is denied that 
amnesty and, instead, deported, his expected loss (relative to had he not come 
forward) will be: 
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24 It will not, though, affect the gross flow in the last year before the amnesty since internal control will 




The first set of terms, again, being the loss in expected wage, and the second set of 









k P  
is because while the cost will certainly have to be paid, there was a probability that it 
would have been paid anyway (had he been caught), and so the loss from coming 
forward is just the difference. 
Combining (31) and (32), and defining P(A) as the probability of being granted 
the amnesty given the migrant’s place on the scale, the migrants who will come 
forward to request amnesty will be those for whom: 
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) ( . 
This will include two groups – those for whom the probability of gaining the amnesty 
is high and those for whom the alternative wage at home is sufficiently high so that 
the risk is relatively low. 
The outcome of such a “fuzzy” amnesty declaration will be that there will be 
some deported, but they will tend to be those who have committed the least grievous 
crimes rather than those who the country would truly like to rid itself of. This will also 
be true since many of those harder criminals will be earning higher salaries doing 
what they are doing than if they became legal (and, as a result, visible). 
 
IV. Summary 
This paper presented an attempt at understanding Why, When and How of 
immigration amnesties, complementing studies by Chau (2001, 2003), Karlson and 
Katz (2003) and Gang and Yun (2006). We have considered government behavior 
with respect to allocations for limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending 
infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties (Why), the 
timing of amnesties (When), and limitations on those amnesties (How). We have been 
able to reach some conclusions with respect to allocations and the flow of immigrants, 




conclusions would require more specific functional specifications. We have also 
considered two extensions – intertemporal transfers of policing funds and “fuzziness” 
in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and 
deporting undesirables. 
The model presented in this paper is deterministic, and thus yields some strong 
results despite the minimal assumption regarding functional forms. For instance, the 
model predicts that amnesties will be evenly spaced temporally. However, a glance at 
Table 1, depicting actual amnesty programs, makes it clear that this is not, in fact, the 
case. There are numerous reasons that the predicted stationarity should not be 
overplayed, since there are numerous sources for uncertainty. For instance, the size of 
the control budget could change from year to year, as could the probabilities of being 
apprehended and the number of migrants interested in migrating (which is a function 
of the relative wages and level of unemployment in each country, themselves random 
variables). Producing a model with such random factors is beyond the scope of this 
paper, however, the basic setup, and the results thereof, are set out in this paper. 
There are many extensions that could be considered, even without including 
uncertainty. Throughout most of the paper we considered a fixed yearly budget. It 
would be interested to consider exogenous changes to this budget, and to see how this 
would affect outcomes. Alternatively, the size of the allocation for immigration 
control could be endogenized in a more general model which incorporates this 
expenditure as part of the government’s total budget, with the size of the yearly 
allocation depending on the sizes of the flows and stocks of illegal immigrants.  
In the model we assumed that potential migrants were drawn from a population 
of workers who were heterogeneous in their wages. An alternative would be to have 
source country wages identical (they could all, for instance, be unemployed in their 
home countries), but have potential migrants differ in other ways. For instance, their 
skills could differ, in which case the better workers would be the first to migrate. Or, 
even if workers are homogeneous in abilities, they could differ in their attachment to 
the source country. Thus, married people would be less likely to move, particularly if 
they have young children. Also, those with elderly parents might be less inclined to 




An additional alternative is differing levels of risk aversion. In the model we 
assumed workers are risk neutral, and so considered only expected income. If 
workers, however, have differing levels of risk aversion (or risk loving), a self-
selection equilibrium can be had without resorting to heterogeneous workers. Since 
there is risk in migrating – the worker may not get into the country (border control) or 
may be apprehended and deported (internal control) – those who are least risk-averse 
will be the first to migrate. The result of this is that those who come may be the most 
risk-loving of the potential migrants – which may help explain why so many of them 
end up involved in risky activities, such as criminal activities. 
The paper also has numerous empirical implications regarding changing 
allocations over time, changes in migration flows over time, and differences between 
countries that grant amnesties and those that do not (perhaps because the stock or flow 
of illegals does not warrant such a measure). We leave all these to future research. 
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1997-8 405,000  Nicaraguan  Adjustment and Central American 
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United States 
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